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Abstract
It is a standard feature of the BSA and its variants that systematizations of the
world competing to be the best must be expressed in the same language. This
paper argues that such single language privileging is problematic because (1) it
enhances the objection that the BSA is insufficiently objective, and (2) it breaks
the parallel between the BSA and scientific practice by not letting laws and basic
kinds be identified/discovered together. A solution to these problems and the ones




According to the Best Systems Analysis (BSA), the laws of nature are the theorems of
the best systematization of the world—with ‘best’ standardly understood to mean the
simplest and most informative (on balance). It is currently a standard feature of the
BSA (since Lewis 1983) and its variants (Loewer 2007; Schrenk 2008; Cohen and
Callender 2009) that a single language must be privileged as the language in which all
systems competing to be the best will be expressed. Two problems have led these
authors to adopt single language privileging: The first is the Trivial Systems Problem
(TSP), according to which, in brief, allowing for suitably gerrymandered languages can
guarantee that the “best” system will have axioms and theorems undeserving of the
name “law” (see Lewis 1983 for its initial development). Language privileging provides a
quick fix to the TSP as long as the privileged language is not among the suitably (and
problematically) gerrymandered. The second is the Problem of Immanent Comparisons
(PIC) suggested by Cohen and Callender (2009). The PIC takes it to be the case that
there are only “immanent” measures for simplicity, strength, and their balance—that is,
measures defined for only one language. With single language privileging, no two
systems ever need to be compared when expressed in different languages, and so having
to use only immanent measures is not an issue.
Though single language privileging solves these problems for the BSA and its
variants, it creates new ones of its own. For one, the BSA is already often criticized for
being insufficiently objective—because it is unclear that there is an objective answer to
the question of what makes a system the best—and single language privileging has the
potential to fuel those criticisms by requiring proponents of the BSA to say which
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language gets privileged. Relativizing laws to languages (as in Schrenk 2008 and Cohen
and Callender 2009) goes some way to resist such criticisms, but, as Bialek (2017)
argues, relativity itself should be minimized (as much as scientific practice allows) when
responding to those who employ the ‘insufficiently objective’ critique of the BSA.
Another issue with language privileging—a version of which is suggested in a specific
critique of Lewis (1983) by van Fraassen (1989), and is here newly generalized as an issue
for any single language privinleging—is that it breaks the supposedly close connection in
scientific practice between the discovery of the laws and the discovery of basic kinds.1
Both problems are, ultimately, overstated, and may be resolved not with single
language privileging, but with the privileging of classes of languages. This addresses
both of the issues just raised. For one, it restores the co-discovery of laws and basic kinds
to the BSA by making the search for laws (via a best system competition conducted in
the course of scientific practice) include a search through a class of languages for the one
that yields the best system-language pair. It also helps to limit the degree to which laws
may need to be relativized to language by reducing the problem of privileging a language
(class) to the already present problem of choosing a measure of ‘best’.
The outline of this paper is as follows. I begin, in Section 2, by laying out the PIC. In
Section 3, I argue that the PIC ignores the existence of measures (illustrated by the
1Depending on the specific interests of the author, there has been talk of “basic
kinds” (as in Cohen and Callender 2009), “fundamental kinds” (Loewer 2007), and
“perfectly natural predicates” (Lewis 1983). These are progressively more restrictive
ways of interpreting the predicates of a language that appear in the axioms of a best
system expressed in that language. Throughout the paper I use the more general phrase
“basic kinds”, but nothing about that usage precludes a more restrictive reading.
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Akaike Information Criterion) that, while not transcendent (since they cannot compare
systems expressed in any two languages), are also not immanent (since they can compare
systems expressed in some different languages). Being sensitive to the existence of such
measures suggests a slightly different problem of transcendent measures, which may be
resolved through privileging classes of languages. The problem for single language
privileging of breaking the connection between the discovering laws and basic kinds is
developed in Section 4, and its resolution via language-class privileging is demonstrated.
In Section 5, I argue that the question of which language class to privilege is reducible to
the question of which measure(s) of ‘best’ (simplicity, informativeness, etc.) should be
used. Lastly, in Section 6, I note that the reducibility just introduced suggests a new
solution to the TSP that is focused on choosing appropriate measures of ‘best’, with the
conclusion being that none of the problems that have prompted language privileging
actually require it for their resolution.
2 The Problem of Immanent Comparisons
The “Problem of Immanent Comparisons” (PIC) begins with an appeal in Cohen and
Callender (2009) to a distinction in Quine between immanent and transcendent notions.
Quine writes: “A notion is immanent when defined for a particular language;
transcendent when directed to languages generally” (Quine 1970, p. 19). Measurements
of simplicity, since they depend on the language in which a system is expressed, are
taken by Cohen and Callender to be immanent in this Quinean sense. Strength, or
informativeness, is similarly immanent, since it is assumed to depend on the expressive
power of the language in which a system is expressed. And, to finish out the set, balance
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is said to be immanent as well, since it will be a measure dependent on immanent
measures of simplicity and strength. If two systems are competing to be the best and are
expressed in different languages, then we would need transcendent measures of
simplicity, strength, and balance, in order to implement the best system competition.
But “there are too few (viz. no) transcendent measures” of simplicity, strength, and
balance (Cohen and Callender 2009, p. 8). Cohen and Callender write that
Prima facie, the realization that simplicity, strength, and balance are
immanent rather than transcendent—what we’ll call the problem of
immanent comparisons—is a devastating blow to the [BSA and its variants].
For what counts as a law according to that view depends on what is a Best
System; but the immanence of simplicity and strength undercut the
possibility of intersystem comparisons, and therefore the very idea of
something’s being a Best System.
(Cohen and Callender 2009, p. 6, emphasis in original)
The only solution to the PIC, since (supposedly) systems can only be compared when
they are expressed in the same language, is to adopt single language privileging.
3 Neither Immanent nor Transcendent
The issue with the PIC is that it ignores the existence of a large middle ground of
measures that are neither immanent nor transcendent. To start, let us examine the
central claim of the PIC: that simplicity, strength, and balance must be immanent
measures. In defense of the idea that simplicity is immanent, Cohen and Callender
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(2009, p. 5) defer to Goodman (1954) by way of Loewer, who writes: “Simplicity, being
partly syntactical, is sensitive to the language in which a theory is formulated” (Loewer
1996, p. 109). Loewer and Goodman are exactly right. Simplicity is language sensitive.
For example, let us adopt a naive version of simplicity, SimpC(−), that is measured by
the number of characters it takes to express a sentence (including spaces and
punctuation). Consider the following sentence.
This sentence is simple.
Its SimpC-simplicity is 24 characters. The same sentence in Dutch is
Deze zin is eenvoudig.
The sentence’s SimpC-simplicity now is 22 characters. So the SimpC-simplicity of a
sentence depends or is sensitive to the language in which the sentence is expressed. Does
that language sensitivity mean that SimpC is immanent? It depends on what is meant
by being “defined for a particular language”.
SimpC is, in some sense, “defined for a particular language”. Insofar as the measure
gives conflicting results for a sentence expressed in different languages, it would be
ill-defined if we took it to be directed at sentences irrespective of the language in which
they are expressed. One way of dealing with this would be to think that we have a
multitude of distinct simplicity measures: SimpCEnglish(−), SimpCDutch(−), and so on.
But doing that disguises an important fact: each of these measures of simplicity is the
same measure, just relativized to particular languages. Drawing our inspiration from the
“package deal” of Loewer (2007)—in which the BSA holds its competition between
system-language pairs (or packages)—we could just as easily deal with the language
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sensitivity of SimpC by saying it is defined for sentence-language pairs. We don’t need,
then, different measures of simplicity. Just the one will do:
SimpC(pThis sentence is simple.q,English) = 24 char.
SimpC(pThis sentence is simple.q,Dutch) = 22 char.
In this way, SimpC is better understood as transcendent, and not immanent, because it
is, as Quine put it, “directed to languages generally”.
Of course, SimpC can’t be directed to all languages, since it will be undefined for
any languages that don’t have a written form with discrete characters. This suggest that
there is an important middle ground between immanent and transcendent measures.
When a measure falls in that middle, as SimpC seems to, I will say that it is a
“moderate measure”.
So which conception of SimpC is the right one? The “devastating blow” that
immanence deals to the BSA and its variants is that it “undercut[s] the possibility of
intersystem comparisons” (Cohen and Callender 2009, p. 6). In our naive example,
SimpCEnglish(pThis sentence is simple.q)
is—if SimpC is immanent—incomparable to
SimpCDutch(pThis sentence is simple.q).
But obviously it’s not. pThis sentence is simple.q is SimpC-simpler in Dutch than in
English (when being SimpC-simpler means having a lower value of SimpC).
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Nothing prevents a transcendent or moderate measure from taking a language as one
of its arguments. Such a measure is transcendent (or moderate), but language sensitive,
and, importantly, it allows for comparisons even when a variety of languages are
involved. That being the case, the mere language sensitivity of simplicity, strength, and
their balance is not enough to guarantee that they are immanent, nor is it enough to
guarantee the incomparability of systems expressed in different languages.
In response to the existence of a measure like SimpC, it might be suggested that
there may well be transcendent (or moderate) measures plausibly named “simplicity”
(etc.), but these are not the ones relevant to the BSA; the measures that do appear in
BSA will be immanent. It is absolutely right to question the plausibility of a measure as
naive as SimpC having a role to play in the BSA. (I certainly do not intend to defend
SimpC as the right measure of simplicity for the BSA.) But I do not think it is clear
why we should assume that the right measures are immanent. Rather, I think that
moderate measures are, if anything, the norm, and an example may be found in the
selection of statistical models.
Following Forster and Sober (1994), statistical model selection has standardly been
associated in philosophy with the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC):
AIC(M) = 2[number of parameters of M ]− 2[maximum log-likelihood of M ]
The full details of AIC are not terribly important for our purposes here; it is enough to
point out that that first term is concerned with the number of parameters of the
statistical model M . Forster and Sober note that the number of parameters “is not a
merely linguistic feature” of models Forster and Sober (1994, p. 9, fn. 13). But the
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number of parameters is a linguistic feature of a model. Since AIC can compare models
with different numbers of parameters, it can—if we think of statistical models as the
system-language pairs of the BSA, and AIC as central to the best system
competition2—compare systems expressed in different languages. AIC is thus a
moderate measure.
It is important to note, however, that AIC is also not a transcendent measure.
Kieseppa¨ (2001) offers a response to critics of AIC who are concerned that the measure
is sensitive to changing the number of parameters of a model by changing the model’s
linguistic representation. The response turns on the justification of “Rule-AIC”, which
says to pick the model with the smallest value of AIC, on the grounds that the predictive
accuracy of model M is approximately the expected value of the maximum log-likelihood
of M minus the number of parameters of M . Crucially,
the theoretical justification of using (Rule-AIC) is valid when the considered
models are such that the approximation [just mentioned] is a good one.
(Kieseppa¨ 2001, p. 775)
Let M be parameterized to have either k or k′ parameters. Then there are two claims
that are relevant to the justification of Rule-AIC:
predictive accuracy of M ≈ E[(maximum log-likelihood of M)− k]
predictive accuracy of M ≈ E[(maximum log-likelihood of M)− k′]
2To make the connection between AIC and the BSA even stronger, it it worth noting
that Forster and Sober (1994) take the “number of parameters” term to be tracking the
simplicity of a model.
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The predictive accuracy of M is independent of the number of parameters used to
express M .3 But the right side of the approximation in each claim does depend on the
number of parameters. In general, both of these claims will not be true. Since Rule-AIC
is only justified by the truth of these approximations, it will only be applicable to
whichever parameterization of M makes the approximation true. The only time when
both claims are true, and thus when AIC is applicable to both parameterizations, is
when the difference between E[(maximum log-likelihood of M)− k] and E[(maximum
log-likelihood of M)− k′] is negligible. Kieseppa¨ concludes:
This simple argument shows once and for all that the fact that the number of
the parameters of a model can be changed with a reparameterisation does
not in any interesting sense make the results yielded by (Rule-AIC)
dependent on the linguistic representation of the considered models.
(Kieseppa¨ 2001, p. 776)
From the epistemic perspective that is Kieseppa¨’s concern, I can find room to agree
that there is no “interesting sense” in which Rule-AIC is language dependent. This is
because, if we are looking to employ Rule-AIC in statistical model selection, what is
available to us is a procedure to check if the given parameterization is one that can
support the justification of Rule-AIC. If the justification will work, then Rule-AIC
applies, and if not, not. Rule-AIC isn’t language dependent “in any interesting sense”
insofar as it simply doesn’t apply to the problematic languages/parameterizations that
undermine its justification.
3This is intuitively true. It is also true in the formal definition of predictive accuracy
given in Kieseppa¨ (1997) and used in this argument from Kieseppa¨ (2001).
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However, from the perspective of the BSA and the PIC, these failures of Rule-AIC
are interesting. AIC (the measure) is not immanent, but it is also not transcendent; it is
merely moderate. Some reparameterizations of considered models will lead to the
inapplicability of Rule-AIC. If Rule-AIC was how we were deciding which system was
best, the existence of these problematic reparamterizations would be, as Cohen and
Callender put it, a prima facie devastating blow to the BSA.
Towards the end of their introducing the PIC, Cohen and Callender write that
What is needed to solve the problem is a transcendent
simplicity/strength/balance comparison of each axiomatization against
others. The problem is not that there are too many immanent measures and
nothing to choose between them, but that there are too few (viz., no)
transcendent measures.
(Cohen and Callender 2009, p. 8, emphasis in original)
Cohen and Callender are probably right that there are “too few (viz., no) transcendent
measures”. In response to this, PIC says that measuring the goodness of a system must
be done with immanent measures, and so no systems expressed in different languages
may be compared in the best system competition. But non-transcendence is not a
guarantee of immanence. We might call the problem that remains the problem of
transcendent measures (PTC). Measures like AIC are not immanent, but they also aren’t
transcendent. That non-transcendence gives rise to a degree of language sensitivity that
will sometimes prevent us from comparing systems expressed in different languages.
In response to the PIC and the supposed immanence of measures appropriate for the
BSA, Cohen and Callender (2009) proposed the Better Best Systems Analysis (BBSA),
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which relativizes laws to single languages. According to the BBSA, a best system
competition is run for every language L (with some restrictions on “every” that aren’t
especially important here) where all the competing systems are expressed in L and the
theorems of the system that is the victor of the competition are the laws relative to L.
But now it seems that we might have at our and the BSA’s disposal moderate measures.
In the face of the non-transcendence of these measures—that is, in the face of the
PTC—the BBSA’s strategy of language relativity is still a good one.4 Our language
relativity does not, however, have to involve privileging single languages. The alternative
is to relativize to classes of languages constructed to ensure the applicability of the
measures employed in our best system competition.
4 Discovering Laws and Kinds Together
Before saying more about what relativizing laws to classes of languages would be like in
any detail, it is important to say something about why we should pursue language-class
relativity over the single language relativity of the BBSA. So, why should we? The
reason is that one of the great virtues of the BSA and its variants is their offering of a
metaphysics for laws that parallels the search for laws that is to be found in scientific
practice, and that parallel is broken by single language privileging. A feature of the
4Without going into excessive detail about benefits (and costs) of the BBSA’s
relativity strategy over competitors, I hope it is enough to note that relativizing the laws
allows us to sidestep the question of which language should be privileged entirely, since,
ultimately, all languages will get a turn at being privileged, and thus, effectively, none
are privileged over all.
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search for laws in scientific practice is that it happens in conjunction with a search for
the basic kinds of the world. This feature encourages us to acknowledge the importance
of language in the BSA, since the basic kinds of the world are, presumably, going to
correspond with the basic kinds that appear in the language in which the laws are
expressed. Thus, when Lewis first recognizes the language sensitivity of simplicity, he
concludes on a celebratory note by saying that the variant of single language privileging
he introduces has the virtue of “explaining” why “laws and natural properties get
discovered together” (Lewis 1983, p. 368).
For Loewer’s Package Deal Analysis, the idea that laws and kinds are discovered
together is central to the view. Indeed, the phrase “package deal” has its roots in Lewis,
who says just before the “discovered together” remark that “the scientific investigation
of laws and of natural properties is a package deal” (Lewis 1983, p. 368). While Loewer
ultimately endorses a version of single language privileging, it is accompanied with a
rough account of how a “final theory”—i.e., a candidate system-language pair—is arrived
at:
a final theory is evaluated with respect to, among the other virtues, the
extent to which it is informative and explanatory about truths of scientific
interest as formulated in [the present language of science] SL or any language
SL+ that may succeed SL in the rational development of the sciences. By
‘rational development’ I mean developments that are considered within the
scientific community to increase the simplicity, coherence, informativeness,
explanatoriness, and other scientific virtues of a theory.
(Loewer 2007, p. 325)
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If the practice of science parallels the Package Deal Analysis, then the processes of
discovering the laws and basic kinds are one and the same.
And it seems Cohen and Callender are also on board with laws and kinds being
discovered together when they offer this nice remark on the phenomenon:
historical disputes between theorists favoring very different choices of kinds
seem to us to be disputes between two different sets of laws [...] it has
happened in the history of science that people have objected to particular
carvings—most famously, consider the outrage inspired by Newton’s category
of gravity. But given the link between laws and kinds, this outrage is
probably best seen as an expression of the view that another System is Best,
one without the offending category. If that other system doesn’t in fact fare
so well in the best system competition—as in the case of the systems
proposed by Newton’s foes—then the predictive strength and explanatory
power of a putative Best System typically will win people over to the
categorization employed. While it’s true that some choices of [kinds] may
strike us as odd, no one would accuse science—the enterprise that gives us
entropy, dark energy, and charm—as conforming to pre-theoretic intuitions
about the natural kinds of the world. Yet these odd kinds are all embedded
in systematizations that would produce what we would consider laws.
(Cohen and Callender 2009, pp. 17–18)
With everyone in agreement, what is the problem? Language privileging, essentially,
happens before the identification (in the BSA and its variants) or discovery (in scientific
practice) of the laws. Though Cohen and Callender will not “accuse science” of
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“conforming to pre-theoretic intuitions about the natural kinds of the world”, that is
exactly what the BBSA (and any other single language privileging variant of the BSA)
does when it privileges sets of kinds prior to a best system competition. Furthermore,
PIC makes it such that “the predictive strength and explanatory power of a putative
Best System” cannot “win people over to the categorization employed” because
comparing two putative Best Systems expressed in different languages (with different
“categorizations”) is supposed to be impossible.5
Relativizing to classes of languages solves this problem. Scientists are able to
approach the discovery of laws and kinds with pre-theoretic intuitions about how to
systematize the world, the language to use when doing that, and the best system
competition. As we will see below, the intuitions regarding language and the best system
competition will locate them in a particular language class. Scientists will move away
from their intuitions about language (and systematizing) when, much as Loewer
describes above, there are languages in the relevant language class that may be paired
with systems to yield a system-language pair that is scored better by the best system
competition than the pre-theoretic system-language pair.6
5At least, it is impossible according to PIC for the BSA and its variants. If it is
possible for scientists, then it is wholly unclear why it would be impossible for the BSA.
6This movement is only metaphorical for the BSA, where all the possibilities are
considered and judged simultaneously. It is helpful, though, to think in the more
methodical terms—of considering particular transitions from one system-language pair
to another, the benefits that they might bring, and then adopting them or not—because
that is what will happen in actual scientific practice.
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5 Limiting Language Relativity
Let us begin addressing how language-class relativity can work by looking in more detail
at the single language relativity of the BBSA. In the BBSA, there are the fundamental
kinds Kfund. The set of all kinds K is the set including Kfund closed with respect to
supervenience relations—that is, K includes every kind that can be defined as
supervening on the arrangement of the Kfund kinds in the actual world. A language L is
determined by the set of kinds for which it has basic predicates, and there is a language
Li for every Ki ⊆ K. For any two languages L and L′, the supervenience relations
between the kinds of the languages and Kfund can be thought of as schemes for
translation between L and L′. The set of all languages Lall can be thought of as the set
of languages that includes Lfund closed with respect to all translations. A class of
languages Li is a set of languages including Lfund closed with respect to some acceptable
(all, in the case of Lall) translations.
To illustrate, let us consider a ‘coin flip’ world. Such a world is a string of Hs and Ts,
which we will assume are the only two fundamental kinds. Another set of kinds might be
Kex = {a, b, c, d}, where the translation that gets us to the corresponding language Lex
from Lfund maps the pairs HH, HT, TH, and TT, to a through d, respectively. An example of
a class of languages that includes Lex could be Ln-tuple: Let an acceptable translation for
Ln-tuple be one that, for a given n takes the set of all n-tuples of H and T, and maps them
to a set of kinds Kn = {kn,1, kn,2, ...kn,2n}. Lfund, then, is just L1. When a through d are
k2,1 through k2,4, our Kex and Lex are precisely K2 and L2. All, and only, the languages
that may be formed through this procedure will be members of the class Ln-tuple.
A language-class relative variant of the BSA will run a best system competition for
16
every class of languages Li. Then S is the set of all systematizations of the world, the set
of all competing system-language pairs for the Li-relative best system competition is
given by S × Li.
We can apply this conception of language-class relativity to our other running
example of statistical model selection with AIC. Recall that some reparameterizations of
statistical models would prove problematic for the use of AIC. To reparameterize a
model is akin to translating it from one language to another. We can understand, then,
the problem of language sensitivity for AIC as being related to some set of problematic
translations. If we subtract these problematic translations from the set of all
translations, then we have a set of acceptable translations which defines a class of
languages that we can call LAIC . LAIC is precisely the set of all languages such that a
system expressed in any one of them will be comparable to a system expressed in any
other using AIC. As long as the moderate measures used in the best system competition
have clearly problematic and/or acceptable translations associated with them, then the
class of languages that may be used to express competing systems will be determined by
the measures used in the best system competition.
This will have one of two effects on the extent to which the BSA must be relativized
to classes of languages, but before going into those details it will be helpful to
characterize “competition relativity”. Competition relativity should be understood in
much the same way that language relativity is understood. The competition of the BSA
is the thing that takes system-language pairs as its inputs, and outputs a best pair from
which we can read off the laws. The competition decides what system-language pair is
best by considering how well they measure up with respect to some collection of
theoretical virtues (like simplicity and informativeness) and the actual world. Much as
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we might worry about what language to privilege, and side-step that problem by
relativizing laws to languages so that every language takes a turn as the privileged one,
we might also worry about which competition, or which set of theoretical virtues, to
privilege. Competition relativity sidesteps the problem of which collection of theoretical
virtues to use (and weighting between them, and means of measuring them, etc.) by
relativizing laws to every way of formulating a best system competition.7
So, either the BSA will be committed to competition relativity or not. Suppose that
it is not. For convenience, suppose further that Rule-AIC is all that there is to the best
system competition. In that case, the BSA will always be run using the LAIC class of
languages. Language-class relativity is not required since there is only one language class
that will ever be relevant to the BSA—namely LAIC , as determined by the best system
competition. Now suppose that there is competition relativity. A different best system
competition must be run for every competition function Ci in the set of all possible
competition functions C. In principle we will need to run best systems competitions for
every pair in C × L, where L is the set of all language classes. Let Lj be the class of
languages constructed according to the translations that are acceptable for the measures
that comprise Ci when i = j. In practice, however, it will only make sense to run a
competition once for each Ci ∈ C, since the pairs Ci,Lj will be unproblematic only when
i = j. Language-class relativity in this situation will be redundant with competition
relativity. We also have it that, in either case (of needing competition relativity or not),
single language relativity remains unnecessary for all the same reasons that
recommended language-class relativity.
7See Bialek (2017) for an extended discussion of competition relativity and the
possibility of its inclusion in the BSA.
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6 The Trivial Systems Problem
The redundancy of any sort of language privileging relativity with competition relativity
offers an interesting solution to the Trivial Systems Problem (TSP) that initiated the
trend of single language privileging.
Recall that the TSP is concerned with the possibility of suitably gerrymandered
languages that can guarantee that the “best” system will have axioms and theorems
undeserving of the name “law”. In the introduction fo the problem, Lewis imagines a
system S and predicate F “that applies to all and only things at worlds where S holds”
(Lewis 1983, p. 367). The system S, then, maybe be expressed by the single axiom
∀xFx, simultaneously achieving incredible informativeness—because of the specific
applicability of F—and incredible simplicity—because, Lewis assumes, ‘∀xFx’ is about
as simple as a system could be. So S will be the best system despite a variety of reasons
why it shouldn’t be, the foremost of which are that: (1) ∀xFx will be a law unlike any
we would expect to find, (2) F would be a basic kind unlike any we would expect to find,
and (3) every regularity of the world is a theorem of ∀xFx, so there would be no
distinction between accidental and lawful regularities.
The problem is solved as long as we can avoid languages that include problematic
predicates like F . Single language privileging solves this problem as long as the
privileged language does not include the (or any) problematic predicate(s).
Language-class privileging likewise solves the problem as long as no language in the class
includes the (or any) problematic predicate(s). That alone might be enough said, but the
redundancy of language-class choice on competition choice offers a more nuanced
solution: The best system competition could be chosen such that the corresponding class
19
of languages does not include F or any similarly problematic predicates. But it could
also be chosen such that F and its ilk are certain to not be the best. Lewis assumes with
no discussion that ∀xFx is an incredibly informative and simple system, but, even if that
is true for the measures/competition, it need not be true for every competition. If there
is competition relativity, then there may be competitions for which a trivial system like
∀xFx is the victor, but for the same reasons that such a system is problematic, scientists
will simply be uninterested in the laws relative to those competitions.8 If there isn’t
competition relativity, it seems unlikely that science would unequivocally endorse a
competition that yields a trivial system (or, if it does, then we would need to take a step
back and seriously reconsider our aversion to such a system).
In the end, there is no apparent need for any language privileging or relativity in the
BSA.9 Its role in solving the problems of immanent (or transcendent) comparisons and
trivial systems will be unnecessary (if a single moderate best system competition can be
identified) or redundant with competition relativity.
8In much the same way that Cohen and Callender (2009) allow for there to be
uninteresting sets of laws determined relative to languages that include F -like predicates.
9The problems discussed is not the only reason one might want to adopt language
relativity in the BSA. It should also be noted that one of the virtues of the BBSA’s
single language relativity is that it allows the view to accommodate an egalitarian
conception of special science laws. Language relativity, however, is not the only way of
getting special science laws out of the BSA. This is an important issue to which the
discussion in this paper is relevant, but a proper exploration of it warrants a more
focused and extended treatment.
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